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Abstract 
Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific 
equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional 
secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than 
an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive 
game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria -
one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units 
in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is 
punished if it chooses to do so. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SECESSION CLAUSES* 
Yan Chen Peter C. Ordeshook 
1 Introduction 
Of all the provisions that might be part of a federal state's constitution, perhaps none 
is more controversial than those that implicitly or explicitly deal with secession. The 
conventional wisdom is that allowing secession weakens a state. As Sunstein (1991:634) 
argues, a constitutional right to secede "would increase the risks of ethnic and factional 
struggle; reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation in government; raise dra-
matically the stakes of day-to-day political decisions; introduce irrelevant and illegitimate 
considerations into these decisions; create dangers of blackmail, strategic behavior, and 
exploitation; and, most generally, endanger the prospects for long-terms self-governance." 
*This research was partially funded by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to the
California Institute of Technology. 
1 
We should not be surprised, then, to see arguments defending nullification or veto 
clauses (Calhoun 1853, Buchanan and Tullock 1963) or, as with Yeltsin's proposed consti­
tution for Russia, over-representation of specific federal units in the legislature (I zevstia, 
April 30, 1993), as better ways to accommodate the demands of recalcitrant political sub­
units that might not otherwise agree to form or join a federal state. Just as the adoption 
of an implementable provision allowing secession is credited with hastening the demise of 
the Soviet Union (by way of encouraging the Baltic Republics to resist Moscow), a liberal 
constitutional secession clause would seem to promote a union destined for disintegration. 
Defending such suppositions, though, takes us to the core of a theory of constitutions. 
Just as we might ask how a constitution or any of its provisions is enforced, we can ask: 
Why would any prohibition or admission of secession influence behavior? If a federal 
unit chooses whether or not to secede on the basis of self-interest, how can such a clause 
influence that interest? If that choice is influenced by the responses of others in the 
federalism who also act out of self-interest, then why would a secession clause influence 
their self-interest or perceptions of it? Another way to formulate these questions is to 
consider Sunstein's (1991) argument that a constitutional provision prohibiting seces­
sion is best interpreted as an agreement whereby federal units pre-commit to strategies 
that preclude secession and that require J>Unishin.g those who defect. The unanswered 
question, though, is: How are such agreements maintained; how are pre-commitments 
enforced; why would a "parchment barrier" influence anything? 
The game theoretic answer to these questions appeals to the idea of an equilibrium. 
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Agreements are maintained if and only if no one has a unilateral incentive to defect 
from the individual strategies that describe them. Complications can be added by con­
sidering other notions of equilibria, such as allowing coordinated defections or allowing 
players to renegotiate agreements as a game unfolds. But the essential idea is that consti­
tutional provisions are self-enforcing if and only if abiding by them, including punishing 
those who defect, is in the self-interest of each participant when everyone else does the 
same. 
However, even if agreeing not to secede or agreeing to punish those who do is sus­
tainable as an equilibrium, we cannot say that setting this agreement to paper influences 
anything. If an agreement embodied in a constitution corresponds to a situation's unique 
equilibrium, then we can employ any number of game- theoretic arguments that rational­
ize the concept of an equilibrium as a prediction about individual action to hypothesize 
that that outcome would be realized regardless of the words a. constitution contains. In 
this event, we would be unable to reject the hypothesis that a federalism survives or 
fails merely as a product of a self-interest that is independent of constitutional provisions 
or guarantees. Thus, to establish the potential influence of constitutional provisions we 
must also show that the absence of any agreement can yield a different outcome. And to 
do this we must show two thin_gs. First, we must show that in the event of a constitu­
tional prohibition of secession that provides for the punishment of defecting subunits, the 
subunits of a federation would, in fact, punish one of their number were it to try to secede 
and that the threatened punishment is sufficient to keep subunits from seceding. Second, 
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we must show that, barring such a prohibition - in effect, granting a constitutional right 
to secede - a different outcome is possible; namely, one in which states secede without 
incurring any punishment. 
Thus, to establish that constitutional prohibitions of secession or commitments to 
allow it can influence choices and outcomes, we must establish that there are at least 
two alternative equilibria and that constitutional language can direct us to one of these 
equilibria or to the other. To the extent that the constitutional bargain coordinates soci­
ety to different equilibria of procedure and process (Lewis 1969, Hardin 1989, Ordeshook 
1992) we can then argue that a constitution not only has the capacity to influence action, 
but that it can do so in a wholly endogenous, self-enforcing way. 
We argue here, in fa.ct, that secession clauses can influence behavior. We do this 
by offering a simple three-person recursive game that allows federal units to secede and 
that confronts others with the choice of punishing or not punishing a seceding unit. We 
then establish that this game has two equilibria. In the first - which corresponds to a 
constitutional right to secede - a federal unit secedes only if it fails to receive a share of 
the benefits from federation that equals or exceeds what it can secure acting alone and 
the other units in the federation do not punish it for doing so in this circumstance. In 
the second equilibrium - which corresponds to a constitutional prohibition of secession 
- a subunit does not secede even though it may receive less than this share because it is 
punished if it defects. And since these equilibria coexist for a range of parameter values in 
our model, we infer that a constitution can coordinate the players to either equilibrium. 
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2 A Simple Model of Secession 
Choosing a model that captures the processes surrounding secession is difficult since the 
analysis of federalism encompasses nearly all aspects of political-institutional design. Our 
purposes are served, however, by considering a simple possibility that, instead of trying 
to capture all potentially relevant aspects of the problem, focuses on what we believe 
are the core dimensions of secession. Specifically, we want a model that admits of these 
considerations: 
1. A federalism that is "profitable" in the aggregate, so that subunits can
earn more acting in concert than each can earn acting separately. 
2. Benefits from federation that are not allocated among the subunits in
accordance necessarily with their individual contributions - in proportion to 
what each subunit might earn if it were to become a sovereign entity. Indeed, 
some subunits may earn less than what they can earn as a sovereign entity, 
and they ma.y thereby regard themselves as disadvantaged by confederation. 
3. The opportunity to punish subunits that try to secede by forcing them to
remain in federation, but with a reduced share of the benefits from confeder­
ation. 
4. The absence of states in the federation that are sufficiently powerful to
sustain the federation unilaterally. 
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5. Punishments that are costly to those who administer them.
6. A continual and ongoing threat of secession. There is never the "perma­
n·ent" elimination of the possibility of secession owing to the creation of some 
new technology of confederation or binding commitment. 
This last consideration - the continual threat of secession - warrants additional com­
ment. Briefly, the things with which constitutions deal are not single events that, once 
resolved, can be ignored thereafter. Constitutions treat problems and processes that 
persist over time and that cannot be resolved with a single choice - the maintenance of 
a separation of powers, of national defense, of a common domestic market, of civil liber­
ties, and so on. Because a subunit can postpone secession and because an unsuccessful 
attempt at secession need not preclude a second attempt, any model of a constitution's 
role must be dynamic - it must view the situation as part of some ongoing process. A 
model that merely gives one subunit a one-time choice of seceding and not seceding and 
subunits a one-time choice of punishing and not punishing cannot be adequate for our 
purposes. 
Thus, with these six things in mind, suppose the federation consists of three subunits 
(our analysis can be generalized to larger federations in obvious ways), denoted by I = 
{1, 2, 3}. Next, suppose each subunit holds an initial resource endowment, 7ri, which
measures what subunit i E I can secure in the event of the dissolution of the federation.
However, because of economies of scale or other advantages of being in a larger unit, 
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suppose the total payoff for all units if the federation is maintained is 'Tr. = K L-7=1 'Tri,
where, in accordance with consideration 1, K > l. 
Next, suppose subunit 1 can decide whether or not to secede at any stage of the 
federation's existence, so that its choice set is S1 = {O, 1}, where 0 corresponds to "not 
secede" and 1 corresponds to "secede". If 1 chooses to secede, subunit 2 and 3 must then 
choose between punishing and not punishing 1, so their choice sets are Sj = {O, 1}, for 
j = 2, 3, where 0 corresponds to "not punish" and 1 corresponds to "punish" .1 Finally,
in accordance with consideration 4, we assume that punishment maintains the federation
only if both subunits punish an attempted secession. A unilateral decision to punish 
cannot thwart the seceding unit's intent, so if either subunit 2 or 3 fails to punish, the 
federation is dissolved. On the other hand, if 2 and 3 both choose to punish, the federation 
is preserved, at least temporarily. 
Figure 1 shows the game tree that describes these choices,2. But to this figure we have 
added dashed lines that indicate the way in which our model accommodates consideration 
6. Specifically, if subunit 1 chooses not to secede, the game repeats itself so that 1
1We appreciate, of course, that a wholly general model allows any subunit to secede, but because our 
model is sufficient to illustrate the role of a constitutional secession clause, we prefer not to allow the 
attendant mathematical complexity to obscure this initial exploration of the potential influence of such 
a clause. 
2We use Pi in Figure 1 to denote the probability that subunit i chooses to secede or punish. But
this notation is an analytic convenience since we only consider pure strategies. That is, in looking for 
equilibria, we only allow p; = 0 or 1. 
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confronts the same choice of seceding versus not seceding in the next period. That is, 
choosing not to secede does not preclude the possibility that 1 will choose to secede at 
some later date. Similarly, if 1 chooses to secede and if subunits 2 and 3 choose to punish, 
the game again repeats. After incurring its punishment - a one-time reduction in payoff 
- subunit 1 is confronted again with the choice between seceding and not seceding. Only 
if 1 chooses to secede and 2 or 3 fail to punish is there no need to consider the issue of 
secession - the federation in this instance is dissolved. 
Insofar as the payoffs entered in Figure 1 are concerned, 
1. if subunit 1 does not secede, subunit i gets ai7r for that period and the
game proceeds to the next period. Thus, O'i denotes subunit i's share of the 
total value of the federation; 
2. if subunit 1 chooses secession and if 2 and 3 punish, the payoffs for that
period are /317r, /327r - C2 and /337r - C3 and the game repeats. Thus, in accor­
dance with consideration 5, the punishing players incur a cost of punishment 
( cj > 0, j =2, 3) whereas the punishment itself is a one-period reallocation
of the pie such that I:y=1 /3i = 1, and /31 < a1;
3. a unilateral decision to punish also yields some small cost, c, which we
can suppose derives, for example, from the political costs of mobilizing public 
opinion to an ineffectual end; 
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4. finally, if subunits 2 or 3 choose not to punish, the federation dissolves,
and each subunit gets its per-period endowment, 1ri, forever. 
Our game, then, is recursive and its solution requires that we specify continuation 
values consistent with the choices of the different subunits. For example, if 1 chooses 
not to secede, then it gets a1 7r in that period plus the value of playing the game further, 
say v1, discounted by one period. If it chooses to secede, but its actions are blocked by 
2 and 3, then it gets /317r for that one period plus the discounted value of v1 . And if it 
chooses to secede but 2 or 3 fail to punish, then it gets 7r1 forever. Thus, we must solve 
for vi, as well as for v2 and v3, such that the choices implied by these values and by 
the other specified payoffs yield decisions that are consistent with these values - that is, 
these values must be self-fulfilling prophesies. 
Because our game allows for infinite repetitions, it, like the repeated prisoners' dilemma, 
allows for an infinite variety of strategies. For example, subunit 1 could try to secede at 
every turn until it is punished, say, X times, at which point it abandons the idea of seces­
sion. Similarly, subunits 2 and 3 could select strategies that punish the first Y attempts 
at secession, and then allow it thereafter. However, since we are interested in establishing 
the possibility of multiple equilibria, we consider only the simplest possibility, namely 
stationary strategies. Briefly, a stationary strategy is one that requires a player to make 
history-independent choices. Thus, with a stationary strategy, a player makes the same 
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choice at any two equivalent decision nodes in the game's extensive form.3• This restric-
tion means, then, that the equilibria our analysis uncovers are, in all likelihood, only a 
small subset of the possible equilibria in our game. But this restriction also means that 
if a constitutional secession clause can influence outcomes in our analysis, then there is 
an even greater variety of possible influences than our analysis suggests directly. 
With Vi representing the value of the game for subunit i, and using the usual definitions
of an equilibrium, the strategy 3-tuple (p;', p;, p;) is a stationary Nash equilibrium if and 
Next, let 8 be the discount factor for all players (we avoid excessive subscripts by assuming
that all subunits have the same discount factor). Then Proposition 1, which employs the 
following shorthand, 
b 1f'j 8 rrj = {3j7r - --C + --C O'j'Tf', 1-u 1-u 
where j =2, 3, establishes that our game has three stationary Nash equilibria. 
Proposition 1 For the infinitely repeated secession game, the following are stationary
Nash equilibria and their conditions: 
3See Myerson (1991) for precise definitions and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Niou and Ordeshook
(1991) for an application of the ideas of continuation values and stationary strategies in a political
context. 
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Stationary Nash Equilibria, Their Conditions and Aggregate Values 
Equilibria 
(0, 0, 0) 
(1, o, 0) 
(0, 1, 1)
Subunit 1 
a > 1!'.1.1 - ?r 
a < 1!'.1. 1 ?r 
0'1 2: /31 
Subunit 2 
-
-
C2 <TI� 
Subunit 3 
-
-
C3 < n; 
Aggregate Values 
2:3 ---: - KL; ?rj i=l v, 1-6 
2:3 ---: - �
i=l v, - 1-6 
2:3 ---: - KL;?ri i=l v, - . 1-6 
Notice now that the two equilibria (0, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0) form a pair in which,
regardless of 1 's actions, subunits 2 and 3 do not punish, and subunit l's decision depends 
solely on whether the benefits its derives from confederation are at least as great as what 
it can secure acting alone. Thus, one of these two equilibria prevails whenever subunits 
agree to allow secession in the event that a subunit finds it in its self-interest to secede. 
Since the conditions under which either (0, 0, 0) or (1, 0, 0) is an equilibrium span the full
range of parameter values (aside from the restriction on a;, there are no other restrictions 
on parameters other than that costs are indeed costs), the existence of any additional 
equilibria point to the need for coordination in order to ensure the realization of any 
equilibrium. And, in fact, Proposition 1 establishes that there is such an equilibrium, (0, 
1, 1), in which subunit l's share, a1, can be less than its proportionate share, 7, but in
which 1 is deterred from seceding owing to the threat of punishment. 
These conclusions can be summarized formally by two corollaries that follow by simple 
algebra from the conditions set forth in Table 1 in the proof of Proposition 1 (see the 
Appendix). Briefly, this table establishes that each subunit has two thresholds in making 
a decision. Letting Mi = max{/31, 7;-} and m1 = min{/31, 7;-}, whereas for j = 2 and 3
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letting Mi= max{IIj,II�}, mj = min{IIj,II�}, then,
Corollary 1 When O'I ;::: MI, PI = 0 is a dominant strategy for 1. When
aI < m1, PI = 1 is a dominant strategy for 1. Similarly, for subunit 2 and
3, when Ci ;::: Mi, Pi = 0 is dominant strategy; when Ci < mi, Pi = 1 is
dominant strategy, j =2, 3. 
Thus, if the conditions set forth in Corollary 1 are satisfied, a Constitutional specifi­
cation of secession rights cannot influence choices and outcomes. However, Corollary 2 
identifies the conditions under which no dominant strategy exists so that (0, 1, 1) and 
(1, 0, 0) are stationary equilibria simultaneously. 
Corollary 2 JiVhen D'I E (/3i, 1;- ) , C2 E (0, II�), and C3 E (0, II�), both (0, 1,
1} and ( 1, 0, 0) are equilibria to the secession game. 
3 Conclusions 
Corollary 2 establishes that there is at least one non-trivial circumstance under which 
a Constitutional secession provision can inlluence evenhia1 outcomes - when subunits, 
in Sunstein's (1991) terms, can believably pre-commit to allow or prohibit secession 
and when a subunit's decision whether or not to secede depends on prior coordinating 
agreements. Specifically, if aI < 1;- - if subunit 1 gets less than its security value from
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acting alone - but not if a1 < /31 - if 1 's share does not become so low that it would
actually gain from the punishment. Thus, there is a range of values of a1 in which a 
subunit is disadvantaged and is thereby likely to demand a provision that allows for 
secession whereas, because they are advantaged in such a circumstance, the remaining 
subunits prefer a clause that prohibits secession. 
Naturally, there are several extensions to our model that must be considered before 
we can use it to utter definitive conclusions about the influence of constitutional secession 
clauses. Although our analysis establishes the need for coordination, it cannot explain 
why a federation would form in the first place in the specific circumstance in which a con­
stitution's coordination function is required - that circumstance being where one subunit 
is permanently disadvantaged. Thus, after expanding the analysis to n > 3 countries,
we should allow any and all countries to secede from the federation at every stage of the 
game. Second, we should also consider non-stationary strategies that allow subunits to 
implement more sophisticated patterns of choices, since doing so may expand the range 
of parameter values for which constitutional secession clauses can influence outcomes. 
Third, we should allow some stochastic indeterminacy in the determination of payoffs 
in each period of play. We can then combine this extension with the second to con­
sider constitution a] pr.mr.W.Ons that..a.llow-.f.or-w1Hlit.��J-6e-GeBsieR. -.'.±akiflg Buchanan's
(1991) suggestion that constitutional secession clauses need not fit some unitary mode, 
we can explore the influence of clauses that allow secession, for example, if a subunit's re­
wards from confederation fall below some level for a pre-specified period of time. Finally, 
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we should add an analysis of bargaining so that the allocation of federation resources, 
( ai, a2, ••• ,an), becomes an endogenous vector that can be reconfigured in each time pe­
riod. This last extension would allow us to ascertain whether the form of a constitution's 
secession clause can influence eventual payoffs and in this way we can begin to understand 
the role of constitutions generally as determinants of political outcomes. 
It is generally true, of course, that describing desirable extensions of a model is easier 
than actually implementing them. Of course, our analysis allows some reasonable guesses 
about things since the influence of parameters here conforms to intuition and since we 
can see no reason why that intuition would be contradicted by a more general analysis. 
For example, regardless of a model's ultimate form, no state should prefer a constitution 
that prohibits of secession if it believes that it would be permanently disadvantaged in 
the federation. From 1 's point of view the equilibrium (0, 1, 1) merely opens the door to 
exploitation whereas (-, 0, 0) ensures against this possibility. Unfortunately, our present 
model does not allow us to answer other questions about a secession clause's ultimate 
impact on outcomes - most notably those that concern the distribution of benefits. In a 
model with renegotiated terms of confederation (renegotiated values of a = (a1 , a2, ... , an)
and stochastic shocks to a, does allowing secession force states to negotiate more equitable
values of a or .does_the_mere.act....oLp.roh.ibiiing..secession..fur.ce .sta.tes., .. .i.n .equilibrium, to
pre-commit to strategies whereby only wholly equitable distributions prevail. That is, we 
cannot yet preclude the seemingly perverse possibility that one way to achieve equitable 
outcomes is to preclude states from seceding when in-equitable outcomes arise. 
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In addition, predicting the types of strategy n-tuples that might exist in equilibrium 
in a more complicated model is difficult owing to the fact that in such a model, the 
assumption of stationarity is less palatable. In a simple model such as the one we offer 
here, this assumption almost certainly fails to exclude any interesting possibilities. But 
in a model in which subunits are allowed to renegotiate distributions of resources or 
in which nature can intervene with random shocks, stationarity precludes demands for 
inter-temporal compensation or strategies that postpone secession until it is revealed that 
nature is biased against one subunit or another. 
Nevertheless, such extensions, although desirable from the point of view of under­
standing the ultimate implications of a constitutional secession clause, a.re unlikely to 
undermine the central conclusion of this essay. Specifically, that conclusion is: the on­
going processes of federalism occasion more than one equilibrium outcome, and at least 
two such outcomes correspond to a pre-commitment, embodied in the provisions of a 
constitution, allowing or prohibiting secession. 
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof. The values of the game for the three subunits are as follows,
- max{p2p3(,817r + bv1) + (1 - P2P3) 172 8, a17r + bvt}, 
Vj - max{ vi(P), Vj(F)}
where j, k = 2, 3, and j -:/:- k. Applying the definition of stationary Nash equilibrium,
{
v1(S) > v1(S) 
Pt = 1 ¢:::::} 
V1 = v1(S), 
{
v1(S) � v1(S) 
Pt = 0 ¢:::::} 
V1 = v1(S), 
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where j = 2, 3. Simplifying these conditions, 
Pt= 1 {:::=:? 
Pt= 0 {:::=:? 
P; = 1 {:::=:? 
P; = 0 {:::=:? 
7rt 1 - p2p3h P2Pa/3t1r + (1 - P2Pa) l _ h 
> l _ h a17r,
(1) 
7rt 1 - p2p3h P2Paf3t7r + (1- P2Pa)
1 _ h 
:::; l _ h O't7r, 
(2) 
Pkh(I - Pt )a;7r Pk1r; Pk/3;7r + l _ h + hpi
- l 
_
 
h + hpi
- (1 - Pk)€ > Pk Ch (3) 
Pkh(I -P1 )a;7r Pk1rj 
Pk/3;7r +  l-b + hp1 - l-b + hp1 
- (1 - pk)l:::;pkC;, (4) 
where j, k = 2, 3 and j -:/= k. Note that since we do not consider mixed strategies, we
assume that i E I chooses Pi = 0 when it is indifferent between Pi = 0 and Pi = 1.
Substituting Pi= 0 or 1 in (1), (2), (3) or (4), there are eight possible cases, described
in Table 1 along with the conditions required for them to be stationary Nash equilibria. 
We employ the following shorthand in Table 1: 
ITJ = f3;7r - 7rj, and IT� = /3;7r - 8 + 1�8a;7r, where j =2, 3.
Table 1. Eight Possible Cases and Conditions Required to Be Equilibria 
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Possible Cases 
(0, 0, 0) 
(0, 1, 0) 
(0, 0, 1) 
(0, 1, 1) 
(1, 0, 0) 
(1, 1, 0) 
(1, 0, 1) 
(1, 1, 1) 
Subunit 1 
a > .!!. 1 
- 'Ir 
a > .!!. 1 
- 'Ir 
a > .!!. 1 
- 'Ir 
O't � f31 
a < .!!. 1 'Ir 
a < .!!. 1 'Ir 
a < .!!. 1 'Ir 
O't < f31
Subunit 2 Subunit 3 
€�0 €�0 
€<0 C3 � ITg
C2 �IT� f<O 
C2 <IT� C3 < ITg 
€�0 €�0 
f<O C3 � IT3 
C2 � IT2 f<O 
C2 < IT2 C3 < IT3 
From this table we can see that (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1) and (1, 1, 1) 
cannot be stationary equilibria since otherwise we must contradict the assumption that 
f > 0, and 01 � f31. Therefore, the only equilibria are (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1 ).
Q.E.D. 
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